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‘The Case of Nikko jiken: Occupation, reform, power and conflict’1
Dr Christine de Matos 
Research Fellow 
CAPSTRANS 
University of Wollongong 
 
Introduction 
Many significant industrial disputes occurred during the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945-
1952) that contested ‘the balance of power between organized labor and management’.2 The 
most famous include the Yomiuri disputes of 1945 and 1946, the TōhōMotion Pictures 
conflicts of 1946-50 (the third most famously known for Japanese police and US intervention 
so visible that the ‘only thing … lacking were the warships’3), and the general strike ban of 1 
February 1947.  Nikko jiken,4 otherwise known as the ‘Hiroshima Incident’, occurred at the 
Japan Steel Manufacturing Company in Hiroshima (Nihon Seikosho) in 1949.  It was a 
smaller but nonetheless contentious and symbolic labour dispute, and occurred in the 
peripheries rather than centre (Tokyo) of occupation power.5 Nikko jiken symbolises many of 
the conflicts between the occupation reforms and the exercise of power, and within Japanese 
society.  These include not only the contestable relations between management and workers 
in defining postwar Japanese labour relations, but also relations between the occupier and 
worker occupied/management occupied, the conflict between civilian idealistic and military 
strategic aims of the Occupation, and of the impact of international cold war politics on the 
 
1 This paper was presented to the 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of 
Australia in Wollongong 26 June – 29 June 2006.  It as been peer-reviewed and appears on the 
Conference Proceedings website by permission of the author who retains copyright.  The paper may be 
downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant 
legislation. 
2 Kawanishi Hirosuke, The Human Face of Industrial Conflict in Post-war Japan, London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1999, p. ix. 
3 Ibid., p. 53. 
4 Jiken can be translated as ‘incident’. 
5 Michel Foucault, ‘Two lectures’ in Foucault, Power/Knowledge, pp. 96-97, refers to the ‘extremities’ 
of power, on which I base the use of ‘peripheries’ of power. 
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Japanese workers at the peripheries of the Occupation.  Nikko jiken is also unique in that it 
involved Australian occupation forces, not just American. 
 
Current occupation literature, including that examining industrial disputes during the 
Occupation era, is dominated by the US experience in the main centres of the Occupation, 
especially Tokyo.6 Literature on the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) is 
smaller in volume, and tends towards painting the broader picture, rarely referring to relations 
between the occupation troops and the Japanese labour movement.7 Using government 
documents from Australia and the United States and Japanese oral testimonies and memoirs, 
this paper both complements and contests the existing literature by examining, as a case 
study, a local industrial dispute in the Australian area of Occupation.  This case study sheds 
light on the execution and impact of the Occupation at the subnational level and reveals the 
oft disparities that existed between the reformist ideals of the occupiers and the exigencies of 
military occupation. 
 
The Background: Australian soldiers and Japanese workers 
 
Japanese workers were ‘liberated’ by the early Occupation reforms related to labour and 
political rights.  The 1945 Trade Union Law, the 1946 Labor Relations Adjustment Law and 
the 1947 Labor Standards Law both prescribed rights and proscribed certain behaviours (for 
example political activities) for workers.  The Japanese labour movement vigorously 
embraced their new role.  This alarmed their US overseers, who feared the growing 
communist influence on trade unions and did not anticipate the level of agency and 
independence of the Japanese workers.  Rather, they had conceived themselves as the tutors 
of diligent and obedient Japanese ‘student-workers’.  The Australian Labor government 
(under Ben Chifley, 1945-1949) was less alarmed by these developments, indeed believed 
 
6 Selected examples include: Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New 
Deal, New York: The Free Press, 1987; John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of 
World War II, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999; Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: 
MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992; Kawai 
Kazuo, Japan's American Interlude, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960; Joe B. Moore,, 
Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power 1945-1947, Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1983; Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in 
Asia, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985; Takemae Eiji, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of 
Japan and its Legacy, London: Continuum, 2002. 
7 Selected examples include: Peter Bates, Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force 
1946-52, London: Brassey's (UK), 1993; Carolyne Carter, ‘Between War and Peace: The experience of 
occupation for members of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 1945-1952, PhD dissertation, 
University of NSW, 2002; George Davies, The Occupation of Japan: The Rhetoric and the Reality of 
Anglo-Australasian Relations 1939-1952, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2001; James 
Wood, The Forgotten Force: The Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan 1945-
1952, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1998.  
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they had not yet gone far enough, and pursued a little-known policy of promoting an active, 
politicised labour and trade union movement in Japan.8
BCOF officially took over the administration of the Hiroshima prefecture from US forces in 
March 1946, and the headquarters was established in the former naval base city of Kure.  By 
1948, the other participating Commonwealth nations (New Zealand, Britain and British India) 
had left, only to return at the outbreak of the Korean War.  Thus Australia was left for several 
years as the sole representative of BCOF.  Australian forces stayed until 1952 (some to 1956 
with British Commonwealth Forces Korea (BCFK)), commanded BCOF throughout the 
Occupation, and left both positive and negative legacies in the area under their administration.  
At its height, there were 12,000 Australians in BCOF.9 Australian military policy in Japan 
was less tolerant and more suspicious of worker militancy than that of the Labor government. 
 
Nihon Seikosho (abbreviated to Nikko), or the Japan Steel Manufacturing Company,10 was 
founded in 1907 in Muroran on Hokkaido as a joint venture with British companies W.G. 
Armstrong, Whitworth & Co Ltd and Vickers Sons & Maxim Ltd.11 From the beginning, the 
aim of the collaboration was to produce domestic weapons for Japan.12 By the end of the 
Asia-Pacific War, Nikko was the largest private weapons manufacturer in Japan, but after the 
war was forced to convert to production for civilian needs.13 By 1949, Nikko was in financial 
trouble. 
 
The events/jiken 
The year 1949 was a highly contentious one in occupied Japan.  Detroit banker Joseph Dodge 
began implementing his ‘Nine Point Stabilization Program’, or ‘Dodge Line’, which included 
measures of retrenchment, tax division, wage stabilisation, cost increases (for example rice, 
transportation), and funding reduction to education and public services.  Dodge and General 
Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP) acknowledged 
that the program would ‘of necessity include measures which will be unpalatable and will 
 
8 See C. de Matos, ‘Imposing Peace and Prosperity: Australia, Social Justice and Labour Reform in 
Occupied Japan, 1945-1949’, PhD dissertation, University of Western Sydney, 2003. 
9 British Commonwealth Forces National Council, ‘Brief History of Australia’s Participation in the 
Occupation of Japan 1945-1952’, 5 July 2000, available online: 
http://www.bradprint.com.au/bcof/history.html
10 Today the company is known in English as Japan Steel Works Ltd. 
11 W.G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co Ltd constructed armaments, ships, cars, planes, trains.  Vickers 
Sons & Maxim Ltd later became the defence wing of Armstrong, and then the two fully merged in 
1927 as Vickers-Armstrong. 
12 ‘Japan Steel Works’, 1995-2003, available online: http://www.jsw.co.jp/en/guide/index.html 
13 ‘Japan Steel Works’, 1995-2003, available online: http://www.jsw.co.jp/en/guide/product.html 
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create temporary hardships’.14 Anti-communist sentiment was also reaching its zenith in 
occupied Japan, especially in reaction to the election of 35 communists to the Diet.  While 
SCAP/GHQ15 did not approve of Yoshida’s desire to create an Un-Japanese activities 
committee, there were no objections to more covert means being used to eradicate the 
perceived communist influence.  These means evolved into two main forms: the ‘red purge’ 
to remove communists, sympathisers and other worker activists from government jobs (later 
extended to the private sector); and the use of ‘democratization leagues’, or non-communist 
unions aligned to the employer, to split unions.  These developments provided employers with 
an opportunity to both save money in wages and to get rid of ‘troublesome workers’ – a 
retrenchment program justified by the Dodge Line, and one that would target workers whose 
trade union activities coloured them a shade too reddish.  In the case of Nikko, the 
retrenchment program was euphemistically called an ‘enterprise readjustment program’.16 
Nikko announced the retrenchment of 622 of its 2073 workers17 due to ‘financial difficulties’ 
on 2 June 1949.18 Worker groups quickly moved into action, and the following represents a 
mere outline of the incident.   
 
The Nikko Labor Union first asked the Council of Labor Unions in the Hiroshima Area for 
assistance.19 On 7 June, the Nikko ‘problem’ was discussed at the Council’s Executive 
Committee (held at the Chūgoku Shinbun Newspaper Company).  A Standing Committee was 
appointed in charge of the Nikko ‘problem’,20 and Nikko workers began to strike on 10 June.  
Over the next few days, the intensity of the incident continued to develop.  Workers 
demonstrated to demand collective bargaining, while the Chūgoku District Committee and 
Hiroshima Prefectural Committee of the JCP formed a Joint Struggle Committee for 
Protection of Japan Steel Mill (Nikko kyodo toso iinkai) and a Struggle HQ of Japan Steel 
Mill (Nikko toso honbu). Union leader and leader of the Hiroshima Prefectural Committee of 
 
14 MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk Virginia (MMA): RG-9: Radiograms, Box 156, Fol: 
Bluebinders: Labor No 54-116, 1 November 1948-6 January 1950, ‘SCAP to Department of Army’, 5 
June 1949, pp. 2-3; Schonberger, p. 263. 
15 SCAP refers to the person of MacArthur, while SCAP/GHQ (General Headquarters) to the 
operational centre of the Occupation in Tokyo. 
16 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Maryland USA: NARA 331 Series 1402 
(L), Box 2275EE, Fol: Hiroshima Area Committee Incident, ‘Hiroshima Area Committee Incident’, p. 
10. 
17 NARA 331 Series 1402(L), Box 2275EE, Fol: Hiroshima Area Committee Incident, ‘Memorandum 
for Major Napier – Analysis of SIB Report on Recent Activities of Hiroshima Area Committee of the 
Japan Communist Party’, 10 February 1950, p. 1. 
18 The statistics relating the number of workers to be retrenched differ in various accounts, ranging 
from 720-730.  See NARA 331 Series 1387(L) Government Section Central Files Miscellaneous 
Subject Files, Box 2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, ‘Memorandum for the Record – Nihon 
Seikosho K.K. Hiroshima’, 12 July 1949.  
19 NARA 331, Series 1402(L), Box 2275EE, Fol: Hiroshima Area Committee Incident, ‘Hiroshima 
Area Committee Incident’, p. 10. 
20 Ibid.
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the Japan Communist Party (JCP), Hayashi Haruchi, was placed in charge of tactics (senjutsu 
iinkai) and Matsue Sumi (from the Chūgoku Shinbun) made chairman of the Committee.  
Also founded was a Young Men’s Movement Corps (YMMC or seinen kodo tai) made up of 
400 young members of the Nikko union.21 
Nikko notified the discharged workers by certified mail and provided a list to the union.22 At 
1 pm on the 11th, 2000 workers moved ‘about within the Company compound, arm in arm’.23
Hayashi, along with ‘several hundred’ union members, took Matsuoka (Chief of the Nikko 
Personnel Affairs Section) to ‘an island spot located in a reservoir in front of the Company 
office’ along with the Secretary Ōkubo.  They used harassment tactics for seven hours in 
order to try and convince Matsuoka and Ōkubo to set up an interview between Hayashi and 
the Nikko president for the following day, which was unsuccessful.  They dispersed around 
11pm after Matsuoka collapsed from exhaustion.24 
On the 12th, 30 members of the YMMC forced their way into the company staff conference 
in the secretariat room, where discussions on dealing with the jiken were taking place.  There 
is some confusion in the documents as to what occurred next.  One report states the YMMC 
took acting Nikko chief, Itagaki, and some other company officials to the island/reservoir site.  
There they held a ‘People’s Court’, and one JCP official, Kurokami, told them they would be 
held there for 3-4 days unless the retrenchment plan was withdrawn.  They were held for 18 
hours, during which time four company officials collapsed from exhaustion and one sprained 
an ankle.25 Another report states the YMMC demanded collective bargaining, which was 
refused.  Thereafter the union members attempted to trick or induce the executives into 
coming out, including fake telephone calls at the watchman’s box for Itagaki, and telling the 
other executives that Itagaki had collapsed.  One executive was carried out by unionists, chair 
 
21 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
22 NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government Section Central Files Miscellaneous Subject Files, Box 
2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, ‘The labour trouble of Nihon Seiko Hiroshima factory’, 6 July 
1949, p. 2;  Australian War Memorial (AWM)114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and 
Conditions of Unions, ‘Trends in Principal Labour Unions – progress of Japan Steel Works Dispute 
since 11 June’,  July 1949, p. 7. 
23 NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government Section Central Files Miscellaneous Subject Files, Box 
2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, ‘The labour trouble of Nihon Seiko Hiroshima factory’, 6 July 
1949, p. 2 
24 NARA 331 Series 1402(L), Box 2275EE, Fol: Hiroshima Area Committee Incident, ‘Memorandum 
for Major Napier – Analysis of SIB Report on Recent Activities of Hiroshima Area Committee of the 
Japan Communist Party’, 10 February 1950, p. 1; AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – 
Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Trends in Principal Labour Unions – progress of Japan Steel 
Works Dispute since 11 June’, July 1949, p. 8.  The latter document states that Matsuoka had suffered 
a heart attack.   
25 NARA 331 Series 1402(L), Box 2275EE, Fol: Hiroshima Area Committee Incident, ‘Memorandum 
for Major Napier – Analysis of SIB Report on Recent Activities of Hiroshima Area Committee of the 
Japan Communist Party’, 10 February 1950, p. 1. 
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and all.26 In both versions, the executives refused to speak to the unionists.  However, when 
one unionist, Kitahira, asked Nagato, from the General Affairs Department and on 
watchman’s duty, for a cigarette, Nagato replied: ‘I can’t give one to a beggar like you.’27 
Nagato was taken to the island in the reservoir and not released until he had read a written 
apology.  In the evening, a Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)28 official arrived to observe 
proceedings, and an unidentified ‘Occupation force soldier’, in a moment of excitement as 
executives were running upstairs for a ‘20 minute recess’ and were followed by unionist 
Kurokami, pointed a gun at the latter’s chest.  The soldier said that he ‘was not supporting the 
company executives only. As he rushed at me with excited eyes, I pointed the pistol at his 
breast in self-defence.’29 
Meanwhile, a ‘Committee for Defense for Common Struggle of Japan Steel Mill’30 formed, 
attracting support from the National Railway Workers’ Union, workers from the Mitsubishi 
Shipbuilding Company, workers from the Mihara Rolling Stock Company, the League of 
Koreans Residing in Japan, the Japan Iron and Steel Union, teachers’ unions, and the 
Electrical Workers’ Union.31 By 13 June, the Hiroshima District Procurations Office began 
investigations into the jiken as negotiations between labour and management began to break 
down.32 
Management withdrew from the negotiations and the company closed the factory on the 14th,
citing loss of confidence in their ability to protect the plant designated for reparations,33 the 
possibility of bloodshed, refusal of employees to work rather than engage in union activities, 
and the role of communists in leading the strike.34 Signs were posted around the factory 
stating: ‘the Factory is closed and entry into it is prohibited.  The people charged with the 
 
26 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Trends in 
Principal Labour Unions – progress of Japan Steel Works Dispute since 11 June’,  July 1949, p. 8. 
27 Ibid. 
28 The CIC was the intelligence arm of the US occupation force. 
29 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Trends in 
Principal Labour Unions – progress of Japan Steel Works Dispute since 11 June’,  July 1949, p. 9. 
30 Also known as the Combined Strike Committee for the Defence of Nippon Steel Workers. 
31 MMA: RG-6, Box 105, Fol: 3 – Spot Intelligence, November 1944-August 1949, ‘Labor Disorder in 
Hiroshima to Chief of Staff’, 17 June 1949; Ibid, 16 June 1949 1930hrs; Ibid., 16 June 1949 1300hrs. 
32 NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government Section Central Files Miscellaneous Subject Files, Box 
2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, ‘Memorandum for the record: Nihon Seikosho K.K. Hiroshima’, 
12 July 1949; NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government Section Central Files Miscellaneous Subject 
Files, Box 2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, ‘The labour trouble of Nihon Seiko Hiroshima 
factory’, 6 July 1949, p. 2. 
33 There is further discussion of the reparations issue on p. 12. 
34 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949, p. 1. 
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maintenance of reparations machinery, however, must work as usual.’35 Workers ignored this 
notice, and turned up in order to conduct a ‘sit down’ strike.  Around 45036 workers broke 
down the gates and occupied the factory.   Allied Military Government (AMG)37 officials 
began to demand police intervention, while representatives of the various participating unions 
made speeches encouraging the strikers to ‘continue to the bitter end’.  Negotiations with 
Nikko management also continued, and while management agreed to continue future 
discussions with the union at a place suitable to both parties, they refused the ‘unconditional 
return’ of the retrenched workers. 38 
Small numbers of police began to arrive at Nikko, and other townspeople began to 
demonstrate at the Funakoshi police station, asking ‘Why are you oppressing us?’39
Discussions between police, AMG, the governor of Hiroshima, Kusunose, and other members 
of local government resulted in a decision to issue an order to union officials on the 15th.  The 
deputy governor made a broadcast over loudspeaker from a hill behind the factory demanding 
withdrawal, but was drowned out by the sounds of sirens, bells, and singing of the 
Internationale.40
On 15 June, 2000 police were mobilised and they evicted about 1000 workers from the 
factory, and arrested around another 30 who refused to leave (all were later released).  About 
22 other workers were injured.  Some strikers resisted by lying down to make it more difficult 
to be arrested.41 The strikers remained outside of the gates, obstructing the building of 
barricades, while the Committee for Defense for Common Struggle of Japan Steel Mill held 
an emergency meeting.   Members visited the governor’s office and made the following 
statement: 
 
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. Some accounts put the number at ‘about a thousand’ [NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government 
Section Central Files Miscellaneous Subject Files, Box 2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, 
‘Memorandum for the record: Nihon Seikosho K.K. Hiroshima’, 12 July 1949, pp. 2-3.] 
37 Although there was not a formal military government as in occupied Germany, there was a military 
government force under the US that was used to enforce occupation reforms and monitor Japanese 
activities throughout the prefectures of Japan.  Australia had limited participation, but did provide 
military government liaison officials to work with US officials from January 1947. 
38 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949, p. 2. 
39 Ibid., p. 3. 
40 Ibid.  Other reports mention a radio broadcast by Kusunose calling for the workers to disperse by 
5am of the 15th, else they would be arrested. [NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government Section Central 
Files Miscellaneous Subject Files, Box 2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, ‘Memorandum for the 
record: Nihon Seikosho K.K. Hiroshima’, 12 July 1949, pp. 2-3.] 
41 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949, p. 3.  Apparently 
police carried these ‘lie-down’ strikers out of the factory area one by one. 
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(a) The Governor was responsible for the unwarranted use of the police force; 
(b) The Governor was requested to show the official document from the AMG; 
(c) The Governor was requested to release the arrested strikers immediately.42
Meetings continued at the Matsuishi Dormitory at the Steel Works site, where the unionists 
made the following resolution: 
 
(a) The Japan Steel Works strike has already become a national and international problem and 
will be developed still further; 
(b) Everybody at the meeting would be expected as a matter of principle to remain at their place 
and carry on the war of nerves; 
(c) On the following day they would leave the dormitory and take up the same position they had 
occupied after withdrawing from the factory and line up against the police.  Their numbers 
would be increased by the mobilization of 2,000 people from the Hiroshima Seamen’s Union 
and Democratic Youth League; 
(d) The Nippon Express Coy Trade Union, Hiroshima Seamen’s Union, Korean League and 
Democratic Youth League would commence a display of force.43
Further ‘Anti-Suppression Meetings’ called for the re-opening of negotiations, immediate 
payment of outstanding wages for May, lifting of the factory blockade, withdrawal of the 
police force, and release of those arrested.44 In addition to the Japanese police, BCOF 
provided military police, field security and military government liaison representatives as 
‘observers’, and two troops of BCOF soldiers entered the building on the night of the 15th ‘in 
view of rumours that workers in large numbers would attempt re-entry’.45 
In the days that followed, workers continued to demonstrate outside the factory, some 
throwing stones at police, and others held demonstrations in other areas.  Unions visited town 
offices carrying banners that read ‘Discharge of employees will smash local industries’ and 
‘Staple foods must be sold on credit’.46 Factory re-entry attempts were made by some 
demonstrators, and others threw objects such as stones and bricks at the factory, resulting in 
the destruction of 12-foot double doors, four sections of factory fence, 40 panes of glass and 
 
42 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949, p. 4. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., p.5. 
45 NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government Section Central Files Miscellaneous Subject Files, Box 
2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, ‘Memorandum for the record: Nihon Seikosho K.K. Hiroshima’, 
12 July 1949, p. 3; National Archives of Australia (NAA): A1838/280  3103/2/1/1 PT1, ‘Cablegram 
Australian Mission Tokyo to Department of External Affairs’, 10 October 1949. 
46 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949, p. 5. 
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four doors of the watchman’s office.47 The Struggle Committee continued to appeal for 
public support, and the following postcard, while not related to the Nikko dispute but to 
railway workers, is typical of such tactics: 
 
The rehabilitation of railways has made considerable progress by the hard work of your 
husband or brothers and sisters.  The Management of the National Railways, however, is 
now planning to discharge one fifth of its personnel and the HIROSHIMA Railway Control 
Office has already made out the discharge plan.  It is said that 3000 people will be 
discharged in the HIROSHIMA Control Office Area but nothing is known as to who will be 
dismissed.  At present our wages are pitifully small and our living standards very low.  If we 
are sacked, there will be no alternative for us than to become beggars and to starve to death. 
 
In order to prevent this we have set up within the National Railway Workers Union a 
Campaign Committee and the members are prepared to fight for their lives.  If your families 
will join with us, our fight will be more effective. 
 
We ask all you families to oppose this retrenchment by appealing to the Town and Village 
Councils and also to send a post-card or a telegram to the Chief of the HIROSHIMA 
Railway Control Office, Area Chiefs, and station-masters.  If this proves unsuccessful, we 
shall together open up direct negotiations with the Control Office Chief and HIROSHIMA 
Divisional Chief. 
 
Please participate in this movement to prevent your loved ones being sacked. 
 
(signed) Campaign Committee 
HIROSHIMA Branch of the National Railway Workers Union 
29th June 1949.48 
On the 17th of June, an agreement was reached between the Nikko union and management for 
the payment of outstanding wages.  Further, a meeting was held between the union and 
management in the governor’s drawing room with the attendance of the governor and an 
AMG representative. Recommendations were made for the transference of negotiations to the 
Local Labour Relations Committee, a body to mediate labour disputes under the postwar 
labour laws, and police were withdrawn from the Nikko site on the evening of the 17th.49 
Three members of the Free Lawyers Society accused the governor with ‘excessive use of 
authority, violence and injuries’ at Nikko.50 
47 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949, p. 6. 
48 NARA 331, Series 1402(L), Box 2275EE, Fol: Hiroshima Area Committee Incident, ‘Hiroshima 
Area Committee Incident’, p. 15; Australian War Memorial (AWM): AWM114  423/10/58, BCOF-
CSDIC – translations, 1947 Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Copy of Postcard sent by 
Hiroshima NRWU Strike Committee to Union Members Families’, translated 4 July 1949. 
49 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949, pp. 8-9. 
50 Ibid., p. 10. 
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However, the demonstrations did not dissipate.  A large meeting/demonstration was held at 
the Hiroshima Peace memorial on the 18th of June, with about 6000 people in attendance.  
The following resolutions were made in writing: 
 
1) Opposition to oppression; 
2) Immediate release of arrested Unionists; 
3) Opposition to Public Security Order; 
4) Reduction of Police budget; 
5) Complete enforcement of the 6-3 Education system; 
6) Opposition to compulsory subscriptions; 
7) To build the Peace City and protect industry; 
8) Payment of medical benefits to injured strikers by the City; 
9) Inquiry into the responsibility of the Mayor, Public Safety Committee Chairman and City 
Police Chief; 
10) Dissolution of the City Council; 
11) Abolition of Yoshida Cabinet; 
12) Setting up of Democratic People’s Government.51 
This is quite a wide-ranging list, from support of some occupation reforms (education) to 
aims with a strong political plant – the latter no doubt a worry to the AMG. A speech made by 
Naitō Chichū of the JCP would have added to this concern, which declared the strike at Nikko 
to be ‘the forerunner of the people’s revolution’.52 Demonstrations, meetings with the 
governor and local officials, and declarations/resolutions continued to pour out at multiple 
places in the aftermath of Nikko jiken. Then on 9 July, Hayashi Haruichi and Takeda Taichi 
(the latter the Secretary-General of Hiroshima branch of National League of Metal Mine 
Workers Unions) were arrested and charged with illegal detention.53 The retrenched workers 
– the event that ignited the jiken – were not reinstated. 
 
Interpretations and Representations 
AUSTRALIAN 
Australian occupation forces became involved in Nikko jiken at the request of the AMG.  
However, the references to AMG in some documents are ambiguous and make it difficult to 
ascertain the exact nature of Australian involvement.  While AMG was essentially a US body, 
 
51 Ibid., p. 11; NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government Section Central Files Miscellaneous Subject 
Files, Box 2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, ‘Memorandum for the record: Nihon Seikosho K.K. 
Hiroshima’, 12 July 1949, p. 3; ‘Hiroshima Unions hold Rally to Protest Govt Action’, Asahi Shinbun,
19 June 1949 (translation in NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government Section Central Files 
Miscellaneous Subject Files, Box 2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes). 
52 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949, p. 11. 
53 ‘Prosecutors Arrest Two Union Leaders’, Mainichi Shinbun, 11 July 1949 (translation in NARA 331 
Series 1387(L), Government Section Central Files Miscellaneous Subject Files, Box 2196, Fol: 
Hiroshima Labor Disputes). 
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the Australian forces attached military liaison officers to AMG from January 1947.  
Australian documents make reference to the involvement of Australian liaison personnel, but 
Australia was still subject to the commands of US military government in its area of 
administration.  It is thus difficult to distinguish the exact actions of Australian and US forces. 
Australian documents are very lean on details, especially considering (or perhaps directly due 
to) their direct involvement in the incident.  A cablegram to the Department of External 
Affairs states:  
 
A company of B.C.O.F. troops occupied the building on the night of the 15th in view of 
rumour that workers in large numbers would attempt re-entry.  Troops were withdrawn after 
several hours when it became apparent that no further trouble would develop.54 
An article by John Rich of the International News Service reported that ‘an Australian 
spokesman’ described their involvement as a ‘routine exercise’ which involved a simple 
‘inspection’, and outside the building, the Australians found 150 Japanese singing the 
‘Internationale’.55 The tone of these reports is understated – there was no real problem, the 
troops went in to back up the Japanese police and left again when there was nothing further to 
be done.  It is also interesting to note that the use of BCOF forces is not mentioned in some 
Japanese reports – or at least the translated versions thereof.  One of the most detailed 
accounts of the jiken, a ‘Report by Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration 
Section’ as translated by the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC), 
mentions the AMG, the CIC and ‘an Occupation force soldier’, but not specifically BCOF.56 
UNITED STATES 
CIC spot intelligence reports, as well as detailing the events, place them within the dominant 
anti-communist discourse.  One report called the incident ‘another in the current series of 
JCP-instigated “guerilla” strikes, designed to culminate in a large-scale labor offensive in 
August or September 1949’,57 and another noted that ‘tactics of open defiance of police and 
governmental authority employed by strikers follow a pattern similar to that utilized by 
Communist infiltrated unions in other recent strikes’.58 The US label given to the incident – 
‘Hiroshima Area Committee Incident’ – further reveals this discourse: ‘Area Committee’ is a 
 
54 NAA: A1838/280  3103/2/1/1 PT1, ‘Cablegram Australian Mission Tokyo to Department of 
External Affairs’, 10 October 1949. 
55 NARA 331, UD1803(L), Box 8571, Fol: 24, John Rich,“Aussie troops enter Hiroshima factory’, 16 
June 1949. 
56 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949. 
57 MMA: RG-6, Box 105, Fol: 3 – Spot Intelligence November 1947-August 1949, ‘Spot Intelligence 
to Chief of Staff’, 17 June 1949. 
58 Ibid., ‘Spot Intelligence to Chief of Staff’, 16 June 1949 1300hrs. 
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reference to the organisation of the JCP and therefore immediately de-legitimises any worker 
grievances or actions as the sole product of the JCP.  On Australian involvement, one report 
states that the ‘use of BCOF troops on 15 June appears to have convinced the demonstrators 
that they will achieve more through orderly negotiations’.59 Additionally, it seems to be a 
little more than a ‘routine inspection’ – one CIC report claims the Australian forces entered at 
11pm and remained until 2 am, during which strikers dispersed at 12.15am.60
REPARATIONS PLANT 
The ability of both the Australian and US forces to act as an impartial observer in the dispute 
was compromised as the factory had been designated as a reparations plant (the idea of 
extracting reparations from Japan had not yet been entirely dropped, and I am not aware of 
the final destination of the Nikko machinery). The plant was therefore under military 
surveillance.61 The governor, Kusunose, repeatedly apologised to the unionists that it was his 
duty to protect the reparations plant for the occupation forces.  One of the Japanese 
eyewitnesses to the dispute claimed: 
 
Nikko was taken over as compensation … its machinery was confiscated and its factories 
forced to stop operating as production plants.  They tried to close Nikko factories in 
Hiroshima … Occupation troops took machinery in those factories out to somewhere else.  
The machine tools were excellent … Nikko had first-class machine tools in Japan at that 
time, according to what I heard.62 
The Nikko management posted notices in the factory stating that those working on reparations 
machinery had to go back to work, even when the factory had been closed.  When workers 
first violated the notice of the factory closure, two officials, one from the AMG and one from 
the CIC, met with Hayashi to inform him that the factory was ‘limited to persons charged 
with the duty of protecting the reparations plant’ and demanded that everyone should leave.63 
The events at Nikko, then, could also be construed as aimed at Nikko employers, local police 
and authorities, and against the Occupation itself, as reparations would be a contributing 
cause of Nikko’s financial difficulties and the subsequent loss of employment. 
 
59 Ibid., ‘Spot Intelligence to Chief of Staff’, 16 June 1949 19300hrs 
60 Ibid., ‘Spot Intelligence to Chief of Staff’, 16 June 1949 1300hrs. 
61 NAA: A1838/280  3103/2/1/1 PT1, ‘Cablegram Australian Mission Tokyo to Department of 
External Affairs’, 10 October 1949; NARA 331 Series 1387(L), Government Section Central Files 
Miscellaneous Subject Files, Box 2196, Fol: Hiroshima Labor Disputes, ‘The labour trouble of Nihon 
Seiko Hiroshima factory’, 6 July 1949, p. 1. 
62 Interview with Kabuto Hitoshi, 2004. 
63 AWM114 417/1/27, CSDIC Translations – Organization and Conditions of Unions, ‘Report by 
Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Department Administration Section – Events which occurred between 
14th and 25th June during strike at Nippon Hiroshima Steel Works’, 12 July 1949, pp. 1-2. 
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JAPANESE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 
There is conflict between the documentary evidence available and oral memory, the latter 
supporting the idea that Australian involvement may have been a little more than a routine 
inspection and the US role a little more intense than many documents state.  Kabuto Hitoshi 
worked at the Mitsubishi plant in Hiroshima, and joined the protests at Nikko in sympathy.  
He spent the night of the 14th at Nikko and stayed until ejected in the early morning of the 
15th. According to Kabuto-san, they were engaged in ‘collective bargaining’ with a Nikko 
executive at the time.  In his words: 
 
While we were collectively bargaining late that night [in the courtyard], an officer of the 
British Commonwealth troops … – we could tell [he was BCOF] from his clothes – 
suddenly pulled out his gun and took the executive, the other party of the collective 
bargaining.  The executive was surrounded by everyone and besides the crowd, there 
were soldiers including the officer of the British Commonwealth troops.  The officer 
suddenly showed his gun to the trade union members and took the executive out of the 
place … This happened at around two or three am.  Then, before dawn, everyone left 
there was ejected by the police.64 
Kabuto-san also described the process of being ‘ejected’: 
 
When we left in serried formation, we were completely surrounded by the police officers 
who tried to … roundup [everyone].  We agreed to leave Nikko in dressing rank 
formation.  A person at the front held a flag, followed by the official representatives of 
each trade union, then the workers of Nikko and Hiroshima shipyard workers … then, we 
[Mitsubishi workers] were at the very rear.  I knew at that moment that the people at the 
back would all be arrested … 
 
As we were at the back, I was afraid of being arrested.  What happened is that the police 
officers pushed head-on the people going at the back … they pushed from behind.  And 
experienced and nasty police officers goaded us from further behind – poked us.  Then 
the ranks became disarrayed and the people at the back couldn’t bear it and tried to go 
forward.  As a result, the people in the middle got crowded out.  The people at the front 
could manage to get out … the gate … In addition, the people at the back began to 
struggle as they were being goaded and police officers also tried to arrest them for 
revolting against the police.65 
There is certainly nothing in the US or Australian official reports about police treatment of 
workers, or of involvement in ‘rescuing’ a company official.  The Chūgoku Shinbun also 
reported that armed police officers fired warning shots, and that ‘batons were used to beat’ 
workers.66 
64 Interview with Kabuto Hitoshi, 2004. 
65 Ibid.
66 ‘Chairperson Matsu summoned and accused at House of Councilors, Japan Steel Strike’ in 50 Years 
of the Chūgoku Newspaper Labour Union, 1997, p. 5. 
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A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 
 
On many levels Nikko jiken is a struggle of competing masculinities: of occupation soldiers 
over all the occupied; of Japanese police forging a new/old postwar role over Japanese 
workers; of police and soldiers working together to defeat dissenting groups engaged in 
challenging the (re)establishing order; of Japanese workers against all authority, forging a 
alternative masculine role to that of the soldier-worker – fighting for rights and livelihood 
rather than nation and emperor.  But a view missing from official accounts is the role of 
women in jiken. The dominant post-occupation self-congratulatory discourse of the changes 
to women’s rights in Japan obscures the experiences of women forging an alternative 
discourse and path67 – especially working class women activists. 
 
Watanbe Tamiko was a member of the National Railway Workers’ Union working in the 
Shiga Machinery Depot, and joined the strikers at Nikko: 
 
The railway factory dispatched trains, and people who were going to Japan Steel could 
ride for free.  So we all went to Hiroshima Station, flashing Red Flags.  We felt so 
uplifted … Even when police officers actually came to attack and take us on, we took the 
officers’ hats or nightsticks, saying they were ‘war trophies’, and showed them to each 
other.  However, the officers came to beg to have them back.  We felt sorry for them, so 
we returned the items.  However, what really vexed me was when we were shut out of the 
factory, and the American [sic] army officers were looking down on us from the top of 
the fence saying ‘hey, hey!’ When we peeked inside the factory, we saw the Red Flag 
being burnt.  We were so enraged that we were crying out eyes out.68 
Shinmi Itoe worked at the Mitsubishi Dockyard in Hiroshima, became an official in the 
Female Division of the union, and joined the striking workers at Nikko: 
 
We loaded straw rice bags on to the truck from the Hiroshima Mitsubishi Dockyard’s 
Labour Union and lots of Red Flags and went to support [the Nikko workers].  During the 
strike it felt like a revolution was going to break out as soon as tomorrow.  So we decided 
we should bring more members from the Hiroshima Mitsubishi Dockyard.  A few of us 
went back and walked around and shouted in the company building: ‘let’s go to Nikko 
and give our support!’ 
 
We were barricading ourselves inside the Nikko factory … We shut the main gate and 
were sitting inside the gate.  American [sic] soldiers came on a jeep.  We thought that 
they would stop in front of the gate, but they didn’t stop, so we ran away in panic.  We 
stayed overnight inside the building, but there were company people and American [sic] 
soldiers too.  We continued to glare at each other for two or three days [sic], but one early 
 
67 For a critique of this discourse see the work of Koikari, Mire, eg  ‘Rethinking gender and power in 
the US Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952’. Gender and History, 11(2), 1999: 313-335 and  ‘Exporting 
democracy? American women, “feminist reforms,” and politics of imperialism in the U.S Occupation 
of Japan, 1945-1952’. Frontiers, 23(1), 2002: 23-45. 
68 ‘Watanabe Tamiko’s Story’ in Watanbe Rikito, Tagawa Tokihito & Masuoka Toshikazu (eds), 
Hiroshima under Occupation: Anti-nuclear – Stories from the Early Hibakusha Movement, (Senryōka 
no Hiroshima: Hankaku – Hibakusha undō sōsōki monogatari), Tokorozawa: Nichiyosha, 1995, p. 
157. 
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morning when it was still dark, a group of policemen came charging, pushing over the 
factory fence made out of timber.  We were ready for it.  We linked each others’ arms, 
establishing lines of human barricades.  However, I heard the police say ‘break from 
there, where the women are!’ We thought to ourselves, ‘we can’t let them look down on 
us’.  So we clung to each other and tried  [to resist].  I realised the police were already 
running around behind us as other parts of the barricade had broken … It was very 
disappointing, but we were easily thrown outside the gate.  There was a pond behind 
where we were standing.  There were many labour union members and police officers 
being thrown into it.  We were chanting slogans from outside the gate.  Women were 
crying so loudly.69 
From these accounts, it appears the strikers were divided into gendered groups – and the 
women were determined not to be looked down upon for being women, and participated with 
enthusiasm.  Conversely, the police viewed the group of women as a weakness to be exploited 
in order to forcibly disperse the workers. 
 
The Rhetorical Aftermath 
While most of those arrested were released without charge, the Japanese police and the 
occupation force accomplished what they had set out to achieve – to break the spirit of those 
resisting the economic ‘reforms’ under the Dodge Line and to ‘democratise’ the labour 
unions.  When the Hiroshima Mitsubishi Dockyards announced their own retrenchment plan 
in the wake of Nikko, Kabuto Hitoshi remembered that they did not strike: ‘we couldn’t.  
Everyone had lost their bravery to fight after seeing the loss of Nikko workers with their own 
eyes.’70 Kabuto-san was himself a victim of the ‘red purge’, as was Shinme Itoe.71 Kabuto-
san reminisced: ‘Those who were purged were activists of trade unions and communists.  And 
I’m sorry to tell you this, but sick people and genuinely lazy people were also included.  I 
think it was a sort of purge of the weak by the strong.’72 But many continued to protest and to 
strike.  In August 1949, the League of Koreans Residing in Japan (who participated at Nikko), 
writing of a protest that turned violent in Shimonoseki (Shimonoseki jiken), invoked the 
recent memory of Nikko jiken as inspiration:  
 
69 ‘Shinme Itoe’s Story’ in Ibid., pp. 162-163. It is interesting to note the reference to the soldiers as 
American in both Shinme and Watanabe’s accounts.  While some Americans were present, the bulk of 
the military presence, by all officially recorded accounts, was Australian. Perhaps it demonstrates how 
memories are influenced by the ubiquitous image of the occupier as American.  However this may not 
be only due to a US dominated occupation discourse, the effects of time and the frailty of memory: a 
survey conducted in the Hiroshima-ken city of Oura in 1947 ‘discovered that the townspeople did not 
know the nationality of the Occupation Force’ [AWM52 8/2/33, ‘BCOF Monthly Intelligence Review 
No. 20’, November 1947, p. 2 (copy courtesy of Yoshida Takayoshi).] 
70 Interview with Kabuto Hitoshi, 2004. This memory conflicts with the fact many demonstrations 
continued in the aftermath of Nikko, but demonstrates the level of local symbolism the dispute has 
collected in the postwar/occupation era. 
71 ‘Shinme Itoe’s Story’ op. cit., p. 163. 
72 Interview with Kabuto Hitoshi, 2004. 
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All democratic forces here in Hiroshima prefecture, after their harsh experience in the 
Japan Steelworks Incident, are resolutely rising to the task of the decisive elimination 
of police oppression. 
 
Smash the rest of the terrorists in the Korean Residents Association! 
 
Down with the police regime of the reactionary Yoshida cabinet.73 
Apparently, the JCP leader Nosaka Sanzo also referred to Nikko jiken and other ‘labour riots’ 
as examples of ‘Fascist Yoshida’s tyrannical oppression’.74
The Soviets also found the jiken to be useful for political rhetoric.  In a potent example of the 
disparity between civilian and military goals and roles in the Occupation, at the same time 
Australian troops were used to disperse Japanese workers and aid company officials at Nikko, 
Australian delegates to the Far Eastern Commission (FEC)75 were putting forward a policy 
proposal to save the right to strike and undertake collective bargaining for Japanese public 
service employees (FEC 318/20).76 The Soviets opposed the Australian proposal on the 
grounds that they thought they had a better one, thus Nikko jiken was used in an attempt to 
discredit the Australian proposal.  The Soviet representative to the FEC claimed Australia was 
confusing the debate over labour policy, which could ‘possibly be explained by the fact that it 
was Austral[ian] Occupation Tr[oops] that had been ordered to Steel Manufacturing plant in 
Hiroshima when mobbing of workers by Jap[anese] police occurred’.77 The Soviet New 
Times magazine reported that ‘Australian soldiers were used to suppress the workers in 
Hiroshima’.78 Soviet attacks did not have much effect on discrediting the Australian proposal 
(the US had already done that by claiming it would further the cause of communism in 
Japan), but the fact the ‘debate’ occurred at all highlights the different approach to labour 
issues taken by the military and civilian/diplomatic components of Australia’s occupation 
participation. 
 
73 AWM  423/10/56, League of Koreans, ‘Refutation of false reports by commercial press concerning 
the Shimonoseki Incident’, 22 August 1949, CSDIC translation 2 September 1949. 
74 NARA 331 UD 1803(L), Box 8571, Fol: 24, John Rich, ‘Aussie Troops enter Hiroshima Factory’, 16 
June 1949. 
75 This was an 11 (later 13) power body based in Washington DC that ostensibly had the power to 
make Occupation policy.  It was usually overridden by both MacArthur and the US government. 
76 NAA: A1838/278  483/2 Part 5, Cablegram Australian Embassy Washington to External Affairs, 7 
April 1949.  The right to strike and engage in collective bargaining was to be removed for all 
government employees with the 1948/49 National Public Service Law. 
77 MMA, Incoming Message ‘DA Washington DC to SCAP’, 23 July 1949. 
78 V. Krylov, ‘Four years after: Tokyo letter’, New Times, No 40, 1949, p. 27. 
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Conclusions and Postscripts 
The case of Nikko jiken elucidates a number of contentious aspects of the Occupation, 
particularly in terms of the so-called ‘reverse course’ of US policy where priorities turned 
from political reform to economic recovery, and in the conflicting aims of the Occupation.  
First, Nikko jiken attests to the level of worker militancy that existed during the occupation 
era and provides evidence of its existence outside the main centres of Japan.  Moore has 
extensively documented this militancy in the more central areas of Japan and articulated its 
potential as an alternative economic and political discourse in postwar Japan.79 
Second, it demonstrates the disparity that existed between the aims of the Australian civilian 
government and the Australian military strategic aims of the Occupation, especially over 
politically contentious or sensitive issues.  The government and its diplomatic representatives 
(that is, through External Affairs) remained reformist in terms of its policy towards the 
Japanese labour movement until the end of 1949;80 the military (and Department of Defence) 
was much more sympathetic to the cold war policies of the United States.  Additionally, it 
demonstrates the conflict between some occupation reforms and aims.  On the one hand, the 
occupation aimed to liberate workers and change the dynamics and relations of power in 
postwar, vis-à-vis wartime, Japan.  A weak workforce was deemed to be one of the problems 
that had helped lead Japan to war.  Yet, on the other, the exaction of reparations as 
punishment and to contribute to covering Allied war costs was another aim.  These two 
specific aims collided at Nikko jiken where the rights of workers had to be measured against 
the need to protect a reparations plant. 
 
Third, it illustrates the condoning of a militarised masculine power in Japan, despite the peace 
constitution, although the ‘militarised’ could only be experienced vicariously through the 
foreign occupiers. Male workers attempted to forge an alternative militant worker 
masculinity, rather than the militarised masculinity of wartime, through worker action; 
women workers pursued a more equitable and participatory social place in the role as activist 
in contrast to the ‘good wife, wise mother’ image, which continued to penetrate Western 
middle-class-inspired feminist ideas in Japan.  Both of these alternatives were challenged in 
Hiroshima by the combined domination of a male, foreign military force and a male, 
authoritarian police force.  
 
79 Joe B. Moore, Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power 1945-1947, Madison: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1983. 
80 Labor lost government in December 1949 to Menzies’ Liberal Party. 
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Fourth, the jiken provides an example of the operation and implementation of occupation 
policies at the peripheries, and of those occupied who offered resistance to occupation policy, 
especially those targeting communist and leftwing activities during the ‘reverse course’. For 
the workers of Hiroshima, Nikko jiken was/is a potent local or subnational symbol of the 
‘reverse course’.   It also demonstrates the relationships between the occupiers.  While 
Australian forces directly participated in dispersing the jiken on the night of the 15th,
representatives of the AMG and CIC were liaising with all Nikko parties before, during, and 
after that date.  Thus, the Australian ability to administrate its own area of responsibility was 
tempered by the remaining small but more influential US presence. 
 
Fifth, the labour dispute demonstrates the impact of the developing Cold War and its 
accompanying rhetoric and framework on the workers of Japan.  While there certainly was 
talk of revolution and expressions of anti-government sentiment, there were also legitimate 
concerns about livelihood and food.  Discussion of the latter was submerged beneath the fear 
of the former. 
 
Finally, it  exposes the collaboration between the occupation forces and conservative elements 
in Japanese society (the police) who together focused not on the ‘rights’ of workers,  or 
whether they had legitimate grievances and what could be done to alleviate them, but on 
maintaining order, control and, to a certain degree, the prewar status quo of power relations.  
As Carter has noted, when Australian troops first arrived in Japan they were alarmed at the 
lack of control the Japanese police force had over the population since the end of the war as 
‘social stability was an important element in a peaceful occupation’.81 Australian soldiers, 
specifically the provosts, helped to train the Japanese police, and general operational 
cooperation between the two was constant. Such cooperation between Australians and local 
police forces has continued in Australian operations overseas, for example recently in the 
Solomon Islands. 
 
Despite ultimate worker defeat at Nikko, the remnants of the divisive labour struggles in late 
1940s Japan, between worker-controlled movements and the imperatives of a capital-led 
economic recovery, subtly remain in Hiroshima today.  Many of those workers present at 
Nikko or similar disputes, often victims of the ‘red purge’ that followed, maintained their 
stand of resistance throughout their lives, including remaining as members of the JCP and/or 
 
81 Carolyne Carter, ‘Between War and Peace: The experience of occupation for members of the British 
Commonwealth Occupation Force, 1945-1952, PhD dissertation, University of NSW, 2002, p. 190.  
See also pp. 170 & 191-193. 
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being involved in the peace and anti-nuclear movement.82 As for Nikko, it did not close down 
due to poor finances.  In 1958, Time Magazine reported that the Hiroshima plant of ‘Japan’s 
biggest gunmaker, Nihon Seiko’, in 1957 ‘grossed [US]$61 million and gave employment to 
more than 1500 Hiroshima citizens’ – primarily by making howitzers, a practice that 
continues to this day.83 War saved Nikko – quite an ironic outcome considering Hiroshima’s 
postwar status as an icon of peace.  Overall, this micro-study of an industrial dispute in 
occupied Japan reveals the impact of reform policies, occupation and local power, conflict, 
and change in the peripheries of the Occupation, and continues to raise questions concerning 
the main beneficiaries of the Occupation and how much was really transformed by the 
experience. 
 
82 This statement is based on interviews conducted with worker participants of Nikko jiken.
83 ‘13th Anniversary’, Time Magazine, 18 August 1958, available online: http://time-
proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,810499,00.html?internalid=ACA 
